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the individual and the social will in which the latter maintains its independent significance, they do not show what the relation is, at least in such a manner as to satisfy our modern scientific requirements'' (p. 189). An attempt at such a demonstration, the author informs us, is the subject of the constructive portions of his work.

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PRACTICAL ETHICS. A Collection of Addresses and Essays. By Henry Sidgwick, Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1898. Pp. vi., 260.

Professor Sidgwick would, perhaps, not object to be described as a teacher of ethics according to general principles. Neither those who heard some of the addresses contained in the present volume, nor those who will read it, can fail to be impressed by the courage and loftiness of mind with which the claims of rational principle and the need for justification by reasonable argument are maintained by the author in every sphere which he touches. The address, for example, on the Morality of Strife will convey to the reader, as it did to those who heard it, a just conception of what is too commonly disregarded,—the ethical value of sheer intelligence, of the mere understanding by the parties to any dispute of the true point and bearing of the controversy, and of the real nature of the claims put forward on either side. We hear so much of the duty of sympathy and kindliness that it is both pleasant and wholesome to be reminded that especially under the conditions of modern democracy perhaps the first duty of all is to make the effort to understand. The reader will learn from this volume how to uphold the supremacy of reason, and to argue upon problems of practical ethics acutely, fully, and dispassionately, according to general ideas and principles. The spirit is the spirit of Mill and Bentham, as Professor Sidgwick would probably admit; but it is transformed by a range of philosophical knowledge very different from theirs and by an experience of criticism which transcends their horizon. If I proceed to make the observations which occur to me from the point of view with which I am familiar, it is merely because I presume that this is the best service which I in particular can render to the readers of this JOURNAL.

What do I mean, it will naturally be asked, by the reservation implied in the phrase, "a teacher of ethics upon general principles"? Is not this the right way of teaching ethics, and can there be any other? Well, what I wished to indicate was this, that Professor Sidgwick, with all his lucidity and breadth of thought, seems to me not sufficiently intent upon connecting particular sets of ethical arguments with the relations and conditions which constitute the individualities concerned. This contrast between his views and mine is obviously and naturally connected with a difference in the ethical stand-points which our training has brought us to adopt. The content of the moral life is derived, as I understand the matter, from relations which constitute and express our individuality. There are general principles in it, but it could not—so I have been led to think—be deduced from general principles; and therefore the argument from general principles of morality, though it demands to be treated with respect, continually fails, to my mind, to reach the root and essence of the matter. It fails, in my view, because it does not sufficiently consider in what way the individuals whose conduct is being discussed are likely, or are not likely, to make the most of their lives, and do the best with the complex of relations which form their ethical being.

This difficulty presents itself to me even in the first two addresses, which deal with the aims and work of Ethical Societies. I feel as if the life of a society was regarded too much as if it consisted of ethical discussion. I am aware, of course, that a society may formally intend its life to be of this nature; but even so, I cannot help thinking that a common experience, a common interest and work, must somehow arise, and must affect the members in a more real way than abstract ethical discussion. I do not think that the general probabilities as to the range of usefulness of ethical societies with a very various membership could have been better stated than the author states them, if stress is to be chiefly laid upon that part of their programme which he was considering. But it seems to me—the complaint may make Professor Sidgwick smile—as if he took the documents issued by the societies too seriously, and the societies themselves not seriously enough. It is interesting, I think, that one such association has been led by its experience to desert the ground of middle axioms, and to transform its work into that of a school of philosophy.

The very suggestive account—exceedingly interesting, too, *per se*—of the famous Metaphysical Society in London should be mentioned in passing as likely to attract the reader of the first address.

From saying that Professor Sidgwick takes documents too seriously, I may pass at once to the fifth and sixth papers in the volume, "The Ethics of Religious Conformity" and "Clerical Veracity." Here, again, I cannot but feel that the importance attached to documents upsets the balance of the discussion. I do not, indeed, agree with Mr. Rashdall, so far as I gather his argument from Professor Sidgwick's representation of it. He appears to me to take too narrow a ground, and in this to follow Professor Sidgwick. But he means, I suspect, something which is well worth considering. At any rate, I do not believe that the problem of remaining or not remaining a minister of a certain church ought to be represented primarily by the question of believing or not believing in some of the documents in which it requires belief to be professed. I do not think that this is the primary question even for the most critically minded, nor does Professor Sidgwick appear to me to state the primary question. It is, in my view, whether, reading *together* the various formularies and accepted expressions of the church's doctrine, and considering its history and present work and aims, its cause seems one desirable to promote, and one in promoting which the individual could find his best life work. In reviewing this question, any one would give weight to such a fact as that formularies, to him obsolete, have to be recited by him in the ritual with an expression of belief. But to any one who has been able to decide the main question in the affirmative, the question of veracity would be so greatly modified as to present little difficulty. I am only discussing speculatively the proportionate importance of the two questions, and I think that the true principle of this is that the society is the first thing, and its documents are secondary; while any one document apart from the others is tertiary or lower. The author only just touches the analogy on which the whole matter seems to me to rest. Is a man bound to cease to be an officer of any association among whose official utterances, by which he is technically bound, are some which he does not agree with? And if so, could any one be an officer of any association which has a long history and has done much work? Is a man to resign if he is beaten in committee on a draft statement of policy? Surely this would make all co-operation impossible. So long as he approves of the actual work and its leading principles, he is entitled to regard many disagreements, even in the representation of facts, as matters of detail. How far the solemn profession of belief alters the matter is a further question.*

I feel a similar difficulty about the treatment of Public Morality in Essay III. Within his own lines the author contends, I think with success, that those who direct the policy of a state are bound to have a regard for the interests of humanity. But the real question, as Hegel, for example, treats it, he does not seem to recognize in its true import, though he approaches it in dealing with Hobbes; that is to say, he does not really consider the differences between the position and relations of a state among other states, and the positions and relations of an individual within a state. He veils this difference both by treating the conduct of states almost as if it was one with the conduct of public men,—the title of the essay would obviously suggest to most readers a subject very different from that of which it treats,—and by speaking of humanity as a community, so as to approximate the relations of a state with other states to those of an individual with individuals in a state. But humanity is not a community, nor, on the other hand, is the state a mere group of human beings; there is no family, class, or citizenship within humanity to supply the content of morality to states as its members, and no law court to safeguard their rights and their existence. Any question may therefore be taken by a state as a question of existence; as to what *is* a question of existence the state affected is ultimate judge, and on such a question it must take its own line, and there is nothing to guide it. Here I think Essay III. is partly corrected by Essay IV., which powerfully points out that no state will go to arbitration on a question of existence. And honor is for states a question of existence.

No doubt a state has an obligation to humanity, but what does humanity mean? A multitude, or a quality? What the state is sure of is that it is the guardian of some one type of humanity, and that by letting that suffer suppression it is so far doing wrong. How to estimate the value of other types, and its consequent duty towards them in the interests of humanity, which it must practically take to mean the best life it knows, it has not the experience and intimacy which would enable it to judge. Again, the whole question is begged if the relations of states are assumed to be *in pari materia* with the private morality of the men who control them. A treaty is not a private promise; influence over another nation is not an opportunity by which, say, the influential statesman's religious views may rightly be propagated. The introduction of the private conscience as such on the scene of public relations may promise a high degree of purity in politics, but is just as likely to kindle religious war, or to inflict horrible injustice by the refusal to tear up obsolete agreements. It is, of course, not indifferent what a man does in acting for a state, but he must act with reference to its functions and relations, and not to his own.

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* To avoid any appearance of countenancing unveracity, I should add that my main contention in these remarks is positive, not negative. I believe that the failure to apply a high standard to the work of religious communities is more common and more serious than undue acceptance of their formulæ; and I think that the former failing is encouraged by any criticism which gives documents independent value.

The essays on Luxury and the pursuit of Culture seem to suffer from a similar lack of essential insight. I think that the final paper on Unreasonable Action is a very valuable piece of ethical psychology, though its concessions are to my mind of more importance than its main contention. Is not the contradiction which Professor Sidgwick finds between a passage in Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," sect. 177, and the remainder of the work, sufficiently explained by Green in sect. 179? Professor Sidgwick's volume will certainly be exceedingly provocative of thought, and it is hardly necessary to commend it to readers of this JOURNAL.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE TEACHING OF MORALITY in the Family and in the School. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Can morality be taught? To this much debated question Mrs. Bryant returns an unhesitating answer in the affirmative. She pursues the wise course of not staying to argue with "those who doubt the efficiency of any definite instruction in the principles of the good life, simply as such . . . holding that it is only by example or as a sequel to religion that morality can be taught," but suggesting to such the "test of plain experience." And it is just this that appears to us to constitute the chief value of the book, that it is not merely the product of a theoretical moralist, but of one who is giving us the results of her own varied teaching experience, an experience which has led her to believe that definite lessons on the subject-matter of morality prove both interesting to those taught and productive of the best practical results.